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I.

Introduction
A great debate has been brewing for years over whether

unions should be able to organize employees outside of the
traditional election procedures provided by the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”).1

Typically, in an

organizing drive, a union solicits support from employees to
indicate a desire to run a National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB” or “Board”) election.2

The union does this by collecting

cards from employees affirming the employees’ desire to have a
representation election.3

If the union collects valid cards from

at least one-third of eligible employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit,4 the union may then petition for a Board
election.5

If the majority of employees support the union in the

election, then the employer must recognize the union and bargain
in good faith with the union for an initial labor contract.6
During the period between the representation election and the
completion of the first collective bargaining agreement, the
NLRA bars the employer, the employees, and competing labor
unions from challenging the representative union’s majority
status for a reasonable period of time.7
Board elections have long been the preferred method of
obtaining union recognition.8 Recently, however, many unions have
begun focusing on another organizing strategy known as card
check recognition.9

In card check recognition campaigns, a union
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demonstrates majority support of the employees in a bargaining
unit by collecting cards from a majority of employees that
express the employees’ desire to have the union represent them
and gaining the consent of the employer to recognize the union
as the representative of the employees without the formality of
a Board election.10

Unions generally negotiate neutrality

agreements with employers prior to launching a card check
campaign to ensure the employer will not oppose the union during
the organizing drive.11

If the employer refuses to recognize the

union, then the union may petition the Board for an election.12
Though the NLRB and courts prefer Board elections,13 unions
generally prefer card check campaigns because they are vastly
more likely to result in a successful unionization drive than
Board elections.14

However, anti-union groups criticize this

approach as an unfair coercion of employees to join unions.15
In 2004, the NLRB granted review of several cases that
called into question the underlying principles of card check
recognition.

In Dana Corporation and Metaldyne, the Board,

reversing a Regional Director’s dismissal of the complaints,
decided to hear cases where the dispute concerned whether or not
voluntary employer recognition of a union based on a card check
campaign should be given “election bar quality.”16

An election

bar is the period of time during which a union’s right to
represent the bargaining unit cannot be challenged by an
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employer, employees, or another union.17

The Board took the

cases to determine whether unions certified as a result of a
card check campaign should be granted the same amount of
protection as unions certified through a Board election.

In

Shaw’s Supermarkets, the Board reversed the Regional Director’s
dismissal of a case where employees’ attempted to decertify the
union, which the employer voluntarily recognized based on the
union’s presentation of signed cards supporting unionization.18
Again, the Board’s decision to hear such a case indicated its
willingness to consider treating union recognition based on card
check as inferior to recognition based on Board elections.
While awaiting the Board’s verdict, a rich legislative
debate over card check recognition has been renewed.

This year,

Republicans and Democrats introduced opposing legislation
specifically related to card check recognition.

Republicans

introduced the Secret Ballot Protection Act19 (“SBPA”), which
would make NLRB elections the exclusive method for union
recognition, prohibiting employers from voluntarily recognizing
a union based on a demonstration of majority support.

Across

the aisle, Democrats introduced the Employee Free Choice Act20
(“EFCA”), which would mandate that an employer recognize a union
upon demonstration of majority support by submission of
employee-signed union authorization cards to the NLRB.21
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This article argues: (1) that the NLRB should define the
“reasonable period of time” for a certification bar following
union recognition based on a card check campaign to be
commensurate with election bar quality; (2) that the NLRB should
not narrow the availability of card check recognition as an
organizing tool in its resolution of Shaw’s Supermarkets; (3)
that Congress should reject the Secret Ballot Protection Act’s
effort to prohibit card check recognition campaigns; and
finally, (4) that Congress should, perhaps with some minor
amendments, pass the Employee Free Choice Act.

Section II of

this article provides contextual background surrounding the
issue of card check recognition.

Section III provides legal

analysis of Dana Corporation and Shaw’s Supermarkets, including
legal history supporting card-check recognition as a legitimate
organizing tool.

Section IV analyzes the legislative efforts to

prohibit and to codify card check recognition.
II.

Background
The purpose behind the National Labor Relations Act was to

ensure peaceful industrial relations between business and labor,
and to provide employees the right to choose whether or not to
organize.22

When drafting the NLRA, Congress left open the

opportunity for employers to recognize employees’ decision to
organize through means outside of the context of NLRB supervised
elections.23

Years later, when Congress made the last major
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changes to the NLRA, legislators proposed amendments to make
NLRB elections the only method to gain employer recognition of a
union, and to explicitly prohibit the use of cards to gain
recognition of majority status.24

Congress rejected these

amendments in favor of maintaining the tradition of card check
recognition.25
Over the course of the past several decades, union
membership in the United States has been on the decline.26

This

trend is attributable, in part, to a shift in the concentration
of the United States economy from manufacturing to services.27
Additionally, increased global competition in manufacturing has
put pressure on employers to resist union drives.28

This

competition has also narrowed the union premium29 that employees
in union shops enjoy.30

While encouraging anti-union campaigns

and narrowing the gap in wages between union and non-union
workers, the shift from manufacturing to services that global
competition has caused has also resulted in smaller sized firms.
Unions’ success rates in NLRB elections has remained constant
throughout the past several decades,31 but the size of the firms
that unions organize has decreased, resulting in unions
organizing fewer employees per NLRB election.32

Changing

demographics in the workplace are an additional factor affecting
unionization rates.33
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Employment legislation may also have, in part, supplanted
the perceived need for labor unions.

Employment legislation

allows employees to “challenge unsafe working conditions, job
discrimination, workplace harassment, and unjust dismissals.”34
Also, “federal deregulation and the 1948 Taft-Hartley right-towork provisions have transformed the organizational climate
facing unions.”35
In the past fifteen years, organized labor has responded to
the decline in union membership by focusing on new organizing
tactics.36

Between 1998 and 2003, the AFL-CIO organized less

than one-fifth of the nearly three million workers it added to
its membership through NLRB elections.37
Adrienne E. Eaton and Jill Kriesky found a much higher
success rate in organizing and in bargaining first contracts
with card check recognition than with NLRB elections.38

This

study found that nearly 80 percent of the organizing drives
featuring neutrality and card-check agreements were successful
in gaining employer recognition, and that approximately 95
percent of those drives resulted in the negotiation of first
contracts.39

In contrast, the study found that the success rate

for unions in Board elections is markedly less, with win rates
between 40 and

45 percent.40

Of the card check recognition campaigns studied, the
overwhelming majority of them, 92.9 percent, featured agreements
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between the union and the employer stipulating that the employer
would remain neutral during the organizing drive.41

Neutrality

stipulations generally require the employer to either remain
neutral or, at least, to not actively oppose the union.42

In

some instances, the employer may communicate facts to the
employees, but the spirit behind the agreement is that the
employer will not attempt to dissuade employees from joining the
union.43
In 73 percent of the agreements studied, labor and
management included language stipulating that if the union
collected signed cards of support from a majority of employees,
the employer would recognize the union without going through a
NLRB election.44

Nearly all of the organizing agreements

included language providing for some form of dispute
resolution.45
When comparing instances of alleged employer unfair labor
practice violations, the study found significantly higher rates
of violations where the agreement strictly stipulated
neutrality, as opposed to both neutrality and card-check.46
Labor alleged violations in 90 percent of cases where labor and
management contracted a neutrality agreement without a cardcheck agreement.47

Where card-check was part of the agreement,

the study found alleged violations in only 42.9 percent of the
cases.48

Similarly, where the agreement stipulated neutrality
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alone, the study found that the employer fired employees who
supported the union in one third of the cases.

Meanwhile, only

8.7 percent of the cases resulted in employee firings in
situations where the agreement provided for card check.49
Nearly all organizing drives without a neutrality or cardcheck agreement featured some form of alleged anti-union
campaign.50

The presence of card-check agreements in organizing

campaigns is a strong assurance to the union, and the unionsupporting employees, that management will not commit unfair
labor practices.51
A study of unionization in British Columbia suggests that
laws prohibiting card-check recognition have a negative impact
on union organizing.52

The study analyzed the effect of British

Columbia’s enactment of mandatory certification election laws on
union organizing success rates.53

Prior to the mandatory

certification election law, if a union demonstrated 55 percent
support through signed cards, the union gained recognition
without an election.54

Following enactment of the mandatory

certification election laws, union success rates in organizing
drives fell by nearly 20 percent.55

Following the rollback of

the mandatory election laws, union organizing success rates
recovered to their pre-enforcement levels.56
While there is ample statistical evidence of the benefits
of card check campaigns in terms of successfully organizing
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workers, there is a notable absence of data supporting
allegations of union coercion of employees during card check
campaigns.

During legislative hearings in the 108th Congress

concerning the Secret Ballot Protection Act, two employees spoke
against card check campaigns and in favor of the legislation.57
While some of their complaints may warrant concern, the
complaints were anecdotal and often off-point.

Similarly, the

leading non-profit organizations which oppose card check
recognition use anecdotal stories to demonstrate the grounds for
their criticism of card check without much in the way of
statistical assertions that card check recognition
systematically promotes union abuses of employees.58

Many of the

concerns raised to a union’s approach to organizing employees
through card check recognition are legitimate, particularly when
in the context of a union-employer neutrality agreement.
However, Congress has equipped the NLRB with the tools necessary
to handle situations when a union abuses its power by coercing
employees to join.59
III. Legal Analysis
The Supreme Court long ago held that unions may gain
recognition as the collective bargaining representative of an
employee unit through means other than Board elections.60
However, the parameters of union recognition by means other than
Board elections are not entirely clear.
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This section presents

an overview of card check recognition’s evolution, and
highlights areas where the Board has indicated it may narrow
protection for unions that gained recognition through card check
campaigns.
A.

Card Check Recognition’s Foundation

Section seven of the National Labor Relations Act
guarantees workers the right to choose whether or not to join a
labor organization.61

Section eight of the Act prohibits both

employers and labor unions from coercing employees in such a way
as to violate employees’ right to freely choose whether to
organize or not.62

Such interference with the right to organize

by either side would constitute an unfair labor practice.63
Section nine of the Act states:
Representatives
designated
or
selected
for
the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of
the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining. . . .64
The Court has interpreted Congress’s failure to specify exactly
how employees must choose a labor representative to mean that
Congress never intended recognition through Board elections to
be the only option.65

If section nine of the Act is read to

permit recognition through card check campaigns, then it follows
that section eight of the Act, mandating collective bargaining
with the labor representative chosen by a majority of employees,
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requires an employer to bargain with a union approved by a
majority of employees through card check recognition.66
Though the Supreme Court has read the NLRA to allow union
recognition through card check campaigns, the Court has
interpreted section nine of the Act to only allow recognition of
labor unions outside of the scope of Board elections in two
circumstances.67

In the first, the Board will recognize a union

as the employee unit’s official representative through card
check recognition when the employer voluntarily recognizes the
union after the union demonstrates majority support through
presentation of validly signed employee authorization cards.68
In the second, the Board will recognize the union where the
Board held an election but discarded the results due to unfair
labor practices by the employer.69
In Gissel, the Supreme Court held that NLRB elections were
not always necessary for employees to obtain majority status
recognition,70 finding that authorization cards were an adequate
measure of employee support for a labor union.71

However, the

Court limited its holding to circumstances where “a fair
election probably could not have been held, or where an election
that was held was in fact set aside” due to a Board finding of
unfair labor practices by the employer.72
In Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, the Supreme
Court clarified when an employer may disregard a demonstration
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of majority status through a card check drive.73

The Court held

that
unless an employer has engaged in an unfair labor
practice that impairs the electoral process, a union
with authorization cards purporting to represent a
majority
of
the
employees,
which
is
refused
recognition, has the burden of taking the next step in
invoking the Board’s election procedure.74
The Court found that while an employer’s avowed distrust
may “mask his opposition to unions,” the employer may also have
“rational, good-faith grounds for distrusting authorization
cards in a given situation.”75

If the employer refuses to

bargain with the union on the basis of the collection of a
majority of signed cards, then the union has only two options:
file for an election, or make a claim to the NLRB that the
employer engaged in unfair labor practices as expressed in
Gissel.76

In Linden Lumber, the Court did not decide whether an

employer commits an unfair labor practice by demanding an
official Board election when it breaches an agreement to
recognize a union upon presentation of validly signed
authorization cards from a majority of the employees in the
unit.77
In Snow and Sons, the employer had agreed to recognize the
union if employees produced signed cards from a majority of
employees.78

Upon producing a majority of cards, the employer

refused to recognize the union, instead insisting upon a Board
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certified election.79

The NLRB found the employer refusal to be

an unfair labor practice by the employer.80

As a remedy for the

employer’s unfair labor practice, the Board ordered the employer
to bargain collectively with the union as the official
representative of the employee unit.81
Precedent clearly establishes that an employer may
voluntarily recognize a union upon demonstration of majority
support through employee signed authorization cards.82

It is

less clear under what circumstances an employer may refuse
recognition upon demonstration of majority status.

Gissel,

Linden Lumber, and Snow and Sons established that when an
employer has agreed to recognize a union upon presentation and
verification of a majority of signed cards, refusal to recognize
may constitute an unfair labor practice and warrant an NLRB
bargaining order.83

The Board explained in Julian, Inc. that “a

union can establish voluntary recognition by showing its express
demand for, and an employer’s voluntary grant of, recognition to
the union as bargaining representative based on a
contemporaneous showing of union support among a majority of
employees in an appropriate unit.”84
B.

Dana Corporation and Metaldyne: Election Bar Quality?

The issue before the Board in Dana Corporation and
Metaldyne is whether “the employer’s voluntary recognition of
the union bars a decertification petition for a reasonable
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period of time.”85

More particularly, should voluntary employer

recognition of a union based on a card check campaign be given
election “bar quality”?86

The Board seemed to resolve this issue

in Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc., where it held that, when an
employer voluntarily recognizes a union subsequent to a
demonstration of majority support, “like situations involving
certifications, Board orders, and settlement agreements, the
parties must be afforded a reasonable time to bargain and to
execute the contracts resulting from such bargaining.”87
However, the Board has recently demonstrated a willingness to
revisit the issue of election bar quality in instances where a
union gained recognition through a card check campaign.
The employers in both Dana Corporation and Metaldyne
recognized the union after the union presented cards signed by a
majority of employees and checked by a neutral third party for
validity.88

Soon after recognition, employees at each company

challenged the union’s certification.

If voluntary recognition

is given bar quality, then employees would not be able to
challenge the union as their labor representative for a
reasonable period of time after initial recognition.

The

Board’s majority raised two factors that distinguish these cases
from precedent, justifying its decision to reverse the Regional
Directors’ dismissal of each case.89

First, in each of these

cases, the employers agreed to recognize the unions via a

15

neutrality and card check agreement prior to the unions’
organizing drives.90

Second, the Board indicated that changing

conditions in the labor relations environment warranted
heightened scrutiny of card check doctrine.91

These two factors,

the majority concluded, warrant consideration of whether the
union’s recognition should enjoy election bar quality.92

The

Board will likely review the Keller Plastics doctrine, deciding
whether “a reasonable period of time” in instances where the
employer voluntarily recognizes a union in the context of a card
check campaign should be shorter than instances where
recognition was based on a NLRB election.93
In NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., after employer
recognition of majority status, a majority of employees signed a
decertification petition.94

Affirming the Board’s decision, the

Court held recognition barred a decertification petition despite
the fact that the employer based recognition on card check
rather than an election.95

The Court explained:

Ward argues that it should not be required to bargain
with the Union because the Union was recognized on the
basis of a card check rather than an election, and it
is unfair to bind employees for a lengthy period on
the basis of such an informal and uncertain method of
selection.
Sec.
9
authorizes
both
methods
of
selection, and we see no reason to set aside the
Board's decision to ignore this distinction in this
case.
Both employers and employees have adequate
methods of challenging the existence of majority
support for a union at the time it was recognized by
an employer on the basis of a card check. 96
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But the Court gave much deference to the Board when reaching its
decision, stating, “[w]e believe that in this situation the
Board should be left free to utilize its administrative
expertise in striking the proper balance.”97

The Court’s

deference in Montgomery Ward to the Board and the fact that it
did not address whether a reasonable period of time for a
certification bar could differ in the case of card check as
compared to Board elections implies that the Board in Dana
Corporation and Metaldyne will have substantial leverage with
which to define a reasonable period of time.98
In NLRB v. Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc., the Court,
acknowledging that the Board “has not fixed any period of
mandated collective bargaining where uncertified unions are
involved,”99 emphasized that a demonstration of a loss of
majority status does not preclude the reasonable period of time
requirement, even in card check recognition cases.100

Cayuga

held that Brooks v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd.101 “compel[s] the
conclusion that the Unions’ status must be recognized for a
reasonable period despite the loss of majority employee
support.”102

Therefore, while the Board will have much leverage

to determine a “reasonable period of time” for certification
bars in card check recognition cases, the Board will not be able
to eliminate the certification bar all together.103
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In Brooks, the Court explained that the NLRA provides
employees with the opportunity to petition the Board for a
decertification election104 and that an employer similarly may
petition the Board for such an election.105

Further, under the

NLRA, after either a certification or decertification election,
the Board could not hold another election for a period of one
year.106

This rule clearly applied to a union certified by a

Board election,107 but the court indicated that “an employer
would presumably still be under a duty to bargain with an
uncertified union that had a clear majority.”108

In terms of

defining what a reasonable period of time should be, the Court
observed that the Board established that one year after
certification the employer can ask for an election.109

Most

importantly, the Court stated that this determination was “a
matter appropriately determined by the Board's administrative
authority.”110
The Board may succeed in limiting the definition of a
reasonable period of time for a certification bar in the context
of union recognition based on card check.

Keller Plastics

stands for the Board’s traditional approach that card check
recognition creates a certification bar for a reasonable period
of time.111

But Keller Plastics did not address the issue of

whether a reasonable period of time for a certification bar
where recognition was based on card check should be commensurate
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with the period of time provided where recognition was based on
a Board election.112

However, that the Board may succeed in such

endeavor does not mean that it should do so.

Providing a

shorter period of time for the election bar where recognition
resulted from a card check campaign puts a stamp of illegitimacy
on the union’s efforts.

This undermines the intent of the Act

to afford recognition to a union where a majority of employees
express a desire for the union to represent them.113

Since the

legitimacy of card check recognition under the NLRA is wellestablished, the Board should afford unions that win recognition
through card check the same protection as unions that win
recognition through Board elections.
C.

Shaw’s Supermarkets

Shaw’s Supermarkets involves the interpretation of a
contractual agreement between the Shaw’s Supermarkets and the
United Food and Commercial Workers Union.114

The Board raised

two issues when reversing the Regional Directors dismissal of
the case: first, whether Shaw’s waived its right contractually
to a Board election; and second, whether “public policy reasons
outweigh the Employer’s private agreement not to have an
election.”115

Here, the Board’s intent to scrutinize and narrow

the availability of traditional protections for unions
recognized through card check seems more apparent.
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The Board questioned whether Shaw’s actually waived its
rights to a Board election.116

The Board recognized that the

contract states the employer will recognize the union upon a
demonstration of majority status, but the contract does not
explicitly state that the union may demonstrate majority status
by the collection of signed cards.117

Beyond not explicitly

acknowledging card check, the Board argued that even if the
parties intended for cards to be a legitimate medium for
demonstrating majority status, the contract does not preclude
other methods as well – including Board elections.118

The

majority does not explain why the parties would bother to
contract for the employer to recognize the union upon a showing
of majority status based on a Board election since the employer
would be bound by the NLRA to recognize the union in such a
situation anyway.119

Implicitly, the majority status clause

should imply a contractual obligation of the employer to
recognize the union based on non-Board election demonstration of
majority support, including demonstration through validly signed
cards.120
In addition to doubting whether the terms of the contract
in Shaw’s Supermarkets demonstrate intent by the parties to
afford recognition based on a card check campaign, the Board
suggested that such an agreement may not constitute a legitimate
contract.121

As a contractual matter, the Board claimed, “there
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is a serious question of mutuality and consideration.”122

The

Dissent disagreed, citing Retail Clerks for the proposition that
a union can offer consideration through waiver of its right to a
Board election.123

In Retail Clerks, the Court stressed that the

NLRB must not interpret a contract clause “to render the
contract promise illusory or meaningless.”124

The majority

appears to be stabbing at contractual issues inherent to card
check recognition agreements to fundamentally undermine the
organizing approach.
The Board’s most poignant reasoning justifying the reversal
of the Regional Director’s dismissal of the case was its
suggestion that the determination of whether the union used
coercion when collecting cards from employees should be the
responsibility of the Board, not of a third party arbitrator.125
Though deference is generally given to the arbitration process
in labor disputes,126 reviewing claims of unfair labor practices
is certainly within the purview of the Board.127

If the Board

believes, on the basis of the complaint, that an arbitrator
failed to handle claims of union coercion in a card check
campaign, then Board review is appropriate.128

Indeed, the

strongest argument that opponents of card check recognition put
forward is that the process breeds union coercion of
employees.129

However, that the Board may review claims of

unfair labor practices in card check campaigns is further proof
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that card check recognition does not jeopardize the rights of
employees by subjecting them to union coercion.130

Where unions

coerce employees to sign cards, employees and employers have a
legitimate and accessible venue to hold unions accountable for
their abuses.
The contractual issues that the majority raised in Shaw’s
Supermarkets seem to be a smokescreen for their intent to
fundamentally change public policy concerning card check
campaigns.

The majority plainly stated, “[w]e have some policy

concerns as to whether an employer can waive the employees’
fundamental right to vote in a board election.”131

The majority

continued,
[w]e recognize that, under current law, an employer
can voluntarily recognize a union based on a cardmajority, and that such recognition can operate to
preclude employee resort to election machinery for a
reasonable
period
of
time.
However,
in
Dana
Corporation and Metaldyne Corporation, we have granted
review to consider inter alia, that issue. We can do
no less here.132
Clearly, the majority does not intend to do less here.

In

Shaw’s Supermarkets, the Board’s majority appears intent on
expanding the inquiry into whether or not card check is a
legitimate organizing tool.133

The Board narrowly reads the

employees’ fundamental right to choose whether or not to “select
or designate” a union to represent them as their collective
bargaining representative to mean that employees should choose

22

whether to organize exclusively through Board elections.134

This

issue has been resolved, as the Board concedes, in favor of
allowing, not only Board elections, but alternatives to Board
elections.135

As the statistics demonstrate, employees face

fewer obstacles to organizing when alternatives to Board
elections are available.136
The Bush-appointed NLRB majority may try to achieve through
the Board what Republicans are attempting to do through the
legislature – eliminate card check recognition as a viable
organizing tool.

However, this is a clear case of judicial

activism whether the Board itself recognizes that the law,
established by statute and interpreted consistently by the
Supreme Court, provides protection for unions recognized through
card check campaigns.

The NLRB should not act in the capacity

of the legislative branch by rewriting policy.

The Board should

leave the task of drastically changing public policy to the
legislature.
IV.

The Legislative Battle
Two issues should permeate the legislative discussion

concerning card check recognition: first, is union coercion of
employees rampant in the card check process; and second, is the
NLRB ill-equipped to handle such coercion.

A survey of NLRB

decisions demonstrates that coercion is not rampant, and that
the NLRB is well equipped to determine whether unions used
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coercion in the process of convincing employees to sign
recognition cards and to provide a remedy in instances where
such coercion occurred.

This section explores these issues

through a discussion of opposing legislative proposals designed
to amend the NLRA with regards to card check recognition.
A.

The Secret Ballot Protection Act

The legislative battle over card check recognition is
largely a battle to either defend or put an end to unionism in
the United States.

United States Representative Charles Norwood

(Republican, Georgia) launched the campaign to support the
Secret Ballot Protection Act (SBPA) in February 2005.137
Writing in the Washington Times, Representative Norwood
lambasted labor unions for organizing workers via union cardsigning campaigns instead of through the more traditional method
of NLRB elections.138

He likened the practice of employees

electing to choose a union through card-check recognition to the
sham elections held for years in Iraq by Saddam Hussein.139

In

his own words:
[u]nder Saddam, there was no such thing as secret
ballots, so of course Saddam won 99 percent of the
vote in his elections.
With a reputation as a
ruthless torturer and killer of anyone even remotely
suspected of opposition, who would dare stand in front
of his fedayeen henchmen and publicly declare they
were voting against him?
Yet that is precisely what
John Sweeney and his henchmen at the AFL-CIO demand of
American workers.140
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Norwood

continued

to

highlight

what

is

at

stake

for

American

workers:
[u]nder this scheme, union thugs are allowed to
confront individual workers on the job and at their
homes, and demand the worker sign a card giving the
union exclusive rights to representation. Workers who
refuse are subject to intimidation, threats and even
physical violence for not agreeing.141
As a solution, Norwood proposes that Congress amend the National
Labor Relations Act to forbid an employer from recognizing a
union unless the union has won majority support from employees
through a Board certified, “secret ballot” election.142
Sponsors of Norwood’s bill propose inserting language into
the NLRA mandating that all newly organized private sector
employees utilize the secret ballot process.143

Specifically,

the SBPA would amend section 9(a)144 so that a union shall only
be the exclusive bargaining representative when “designated or
selected by a secret ballot election conducted by the National

Labor Relations Board.”145

This language would preclude union

recognition on the basis of voluntary card check agreements.146
If successful, the SBPA would reverse a long tradition of
promoting peaceful relations between employers and labor unions
through employers’ voluntary recognition of labor unions.147
However distasteful and sophomoric Norwood’s analogizing of
AFL-CIO union organizers to Saddam Hussein’s fedayeen might be,
flatly dismissing the Secret Ballot Protection Act would be a
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mistake.

A strong movement of anti-union legislators,

businesses, and non-profit organizations is waging a concerted
effort to bring an end to card check recognition.
Charles Cohen, a former Board member, issued a statement to
the House Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations on behalf
of the United States Chamber of Commerce condemning card check
recognition and supporting the SBPA.148

His statements focused

on the effectiveness of the NLRB election process, and his
distaste for card check recognition.149

In terms of the NLRB

process, Cohen took issue with labor union accusations that
Board elections are slow and ineffective, citing that in 2003
over 90 percent of representation elections occurred within 56
days of a union filing the election petition.150

Additionally,

Cohen points to the fact that unions currently win more then 50
percent of NLRB elections.151

Though Cohen points legitimately

to the effectiveness of NLRB elections,152 this does not detract
from unions’ legitimate interest in organizing workers and
workers interest in being organized.

Card check campaigns have

a success rate that is 60 percent higher than the NLRB election
process.153

Fifty-six days and a 50 percent win rate are not

impressive when compared to an 80 percent win rate with card
check recognition.
It is Cohen’s second criticism that resonates more with the
anti-card check movement.

Cohen claims that voluntary employer
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recognition and card check campaigns do not focus on organizing
workers, but instead target employers through “political,
regulatory, public relations and other forms of non-conventional
pressure has become known as a ‘corporate campaign.’”154

He

concludes that “[the] use of corporate campaigns and
neutrality/card check agreements over the last decade . . . has
eroded employee free choice and reflects a shift in focus from
organizing employees to organizing employers.”155

Here, contrary

to the view of the Supreme Court, Cohen assumes that the
collection of signed cards is inherently coercive – contrary to
the free choice of employees and contrary to the free choice of
employers.156

However, Cohen never reconciles why unions and

employees file so many unfair labor practice charges in the
course of Board election campaigns, and yet so few are filed by
employers and employees in card check campaigns.
While Cohen’s argument is better reasoned than
Representative Norwood’s wild claims, like Norwood, he fails to
explain statistically how this alleged coercion manifests
itself.

The NLRA indeed protects the free choice of workers.157

But the NLRA does not protect employee free choice by
exclusively providing a right to vote.158

The NLRA, as

interpreted for years by the Supreme Court, also allows
employees to express their choice to organize through means
other than the NLRB election159 – presumably to insure their
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right to freely select a bargaining representative.

There is

ample evidence that in virtually all NLRB elections, management
commits some act of coercion against its employees.160

But that

evidence is utterly lacking in terms of demonstrating union
coercion of employees in non-NLRB elections.

If card check

campaigns are in fact less coercive than Board elections, as
statistics demonstrate, then such campaigns serve to better
honor employees’ desires to organize or not.

If, on the other

hand, coercion during card check campaigns was as much of a
threat as advocates of the SBPA have suggested, then the witch
hunt by groups such as National Right to Work Legal Defense
would have produced a substantial number of employee suits
challenging union recognition based on card check.

In the

absence of such suits or statistics demonstrating systematic
coercion in card check campaigns, claims of coercion seem
shallow.
NLRB Regional Director Gerald Kobell dismissed one of the
few complaints filed alleging union coercion in a card
campaign.161

Kobell explained that the complaint, filed by

William Messenger of the National Right to Work Legal Defense
(NRWLD) on behalf of employees of the Metaldyne Corporation,162
was based on “an affidavit from an employee, who is not in the
bargaining unit, in which she states her belief that other
employees signed authorization cards because of coercion and/or
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misrepresentation.”163

Kobell found the complaint so lacking in

merit as to not warrant trial on the merits.

Though this

dismissal is anecdotal, it perhaps reflects the dearth of
reasonable grounds for opposition to card check campaigns.
Employees and employers rarely file complaints with the Board
claiming coercion, and when such complaints are filed, they are
often filed with the encouragement of anti-union groups.

While

that encouragement does not in itself delegitimate the
complaints, complaints based on belief or conjecture do not
warrant much merit.
In Playskool, Inc.,164 the NLRB heard a complaint alleging
employer and union coercion where the employer voluntarily
recognized the union on the basis of card check recognition.165
The Board did not find that initial recognition of the union was
the product of coercion, but did find that the union unlawfully
coerced new employees into joining the union immediately upon
hire.166

Card check recognition, as used here, was deemed not

coercive.167

But the fact that the Board analyzed allegations of

union coercion with respect to several employees, finding
coercion in certain circumstances and not in others,168
demonstrates the Board’s ability to decide such matters.
More recently, in Duane Reade, Inc., the Board heard
allegations of union and employer coercion of employees in a
card check campaign.169

The Board found that the employer’s
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assistance to one labor union by “directing employees to a
meeting . . . for the purpose of signing up with that particular
Union” constituted coercion where the manager of the plant
“remained present at the meeting while 17 employees, a majority,
signed union cards” in support of recognition of that union over
the petitioner union.170

In Tecumseh Corrugated Box Company, the

Board heard and analyzed a complaint alleging union and employer
coercion in a card check campaign and found no coercion.171
The Board hears and decides issues of union coercion
infrequently, but routinely.

Union coercion is the exception,

not the rule in card check campaigns.

When coercion occurs, the

Board is well equipped to detect it and to prevent recognition
of the union when appropriate.

Since coercion is not rampant

and the Board is quite able to address coercion when it does
occur, the threat of coercion should not be grounds for the
legislature to amend the NLRA to eliminate the most effective
method of organizing employees.
Cohen’s claim regarding union coercion raises issues of
secondary boycotts in corporate campaigns.172

Cohen claims that

when unions pressure other members of the community, including
consumers who frequent other businesses, to support union
recognition at a particular site, the union engages in secondary
boycotts.173

NLRA provision

§ 8(a)(1), creates a right for

employees to not only organize and bargain collectively, but
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also to “engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”174
However, it is an unfair labor practice under NLRA §§ 8(b)(4)(i)
and (ii) for a union to engage in coercive acts that have a
secondary purpose of causing third parties to terminate
relations with a targeted employer.175

But § 8(b)(4)(d) stresses

that unions and employees retain the right to make public their
dispute with the employer.176

In construing the NLRA, the

Supreme Court in Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
stated that “more than mere persuasion is necessary to prove a
violation of § 8(b)(4)(ii): that section requires a showing of
threats, coercion, or restraints.”177

The Court stressed that

the prohibition should not be given a “broad sweep.”178

The

Court concluded that the union activity of passing out
informational hand bills at a targeted shopping mall did not
rise to an unfair labor practice as it did not have a “coercive
effect on customers of the mall.”179

The union members merely

tried to “persuade customers not to shop in the mall.”180
Cohen cites to no cases or theories suggesting that the
NLRB has found or should find corporate campaigns to be unfair
labor practices based on a theory of secondary boycotts.

Under

the current interpretation of section 8 of the NLRA, the NLRB
could find that such campaigns, under certain circumstances,
rise above the level of persuasion to meet the unfair labor
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practice level of coercion.

However, the Board is already well

equipped to make such a determination and does not need the
Secret Ballot Protection Act to aid it in its judgment.
Over the course of the past decade, relatively few cases
have been brought before the NLRB alleging union coercion of
employees in card check campaigns, and fewer findings of
coercion have been made by the Board.

When these cases have

come before the Board, the Board has been able to evaluate the
claims and make decisions accordingly.
for legislative interference.

This obviates the need

The fact that the Board is

currently well equipped to deal with allegations of coercion in
card check campaigns suggests an ulterior motive for advocates
of the SBPA, which Representative Norwood was rather open about:
destroying the labor movement all together.181

In fact,

Representative Norwood rather candidly explained his view of the
nature of the threat that unions pose to the United States.

In

his kick off to reintroduce the SBPA, to demonstrate why
amending the NLRA to prohibit card check was so important, he
wrote in the Washington Times that the behavior of the AFL-CIO
in its card check campaigns
is precisely the kind of tyranny that Americans are
fighting and dying to defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan.
It is the kind of despotism that we have fought
against since Bunker Hill. It is a key 21st-century
justification
for
why
we
still
need
the
2nd
Amendment.182
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Representative Norwood, likening the AFL-CIO to Saddam Hussein,
Al-Queda, and our former colonizers, insists that the United
States must defend against the threat posed to this nation by
organized labor – apparently not only by amending the NLRA, but
also by arming ourselves.183

Apparently, if the despotic AFL-CIO

gets too out of control, Americans may be pushed to form a “well
regulated militia” for the sake of preserving the security of
our free state.184
B.

The Employee Free Choice Act

Democrats, Representative George Miller (California) and
Senator Edward Kennedy (Massachusetts), have reintroduced the
Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA).185

The EFCA, if passed, would

amend the NLRA to provide employees the opportunity to file a
petition with the NLRB alleging majority support for a union.186
Employees could demonstrate this support with signed cards.

The

Board would then investigate the petition and determine whether
recognition was appropriate.

If appropriate, the Board would

not order an election, but would instead certify the union as
the exclusive representative of the employee unit.187
When initially introducing the EFCA in July 2004, Miller
said, “[u]nions make good economic sense.

They help workers

secure better wages, benefits and workplace conditions for
themselves. Unions also help non-union workers by setting
standards for other workplaces, bringing broad gains to all
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workers.”188

He also claimed that, “[a]mid continuing changes in

the global economy, there is a deeply troubling pattern of
employers suppressing workers’ organizing rights.

This assault

on workers’ rights is the leading cause of the decline in union
membership, which in turn is shrinking the middle class’ share
of America’s economic growth.”189

Miller’s solution was to

codify a union’s right to organize outside of the mechanism of
the certified NLRB election.190

This would fundamentally alter

card check recognition drives, ending the tradition of voluntary
employer recognition and forcing the employer to recognize a
union upon NLRB determination that a majority of employees in an
employee unit expressed support for a union through validly
signed authorization cards.191
The Employee Free Choice Act better promotes the aims of
the NLRA than the Secret Ballot Protection Act.

The NLRA

preserves an employee’s right to choose whether or not to
organize by mandating that if a majority of employees in a unit
express a desire to organize, their employer must recognize and
bargain with their chosen representative.192
Without substantial support demonstrating the threat to the
employee’s right to choose, the SBPA attempts to cut one of two
viable approaches for employees to choose a labor
representative.193

At this moment in history, the approach that

the SBPA would eliminate is the most effective organizing tool
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employees wishing to organize have at their disposal.

Absent

evidence of coercion, this effort to limit how employees choose
a labor representative seems contrary to the spirit of the
NLRA.194
The Employee Free Choice Act seeks to preserve an
employee’s right to choose a labor representative outside of the
NLRB election process.195
of this process.196

The EFCA provides for NLRB oversight

The Board is experienced in making

determinations of whether signed cards are valid or not, and
would have little difficulty in adapting to the new requirements
imposed by the Employee Free Choice Act.
A possible amendment to the Employee Free Choice Act would
be to include a slightly higher threshold requirement for
mandatory employer recognition.

This would likely reduce the

number of disputes between employers and petitioning unions
while at the same time reduce opposition to the EFCA itself,
making its passage more likely.

A signed card threshold of 55

percent, rather than a simple majority, would reduce the
likelihood of challenges and perhaps allay some fears of
legislators in considering the legislation.
V.

Conclusion

The NLRB should find that the period of time for a
certification bar in circumstances where an employer recognized
a union on the basis of card check recognition should be
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commensurate with that provided when recognition was based on a
Board election.

Though the Board would be within its statutory

authority to find that a reasonable period of time for a
certification bar should be less than that provided in the case
of a Board election, such a determination would undermine the
ability of a union to effectively bargain with an employer for
an initial contract.

That could have the dual effect of

encouraging an employer to resist bargaining in good faith with
the union with the hope of undermining the union’s
certification.

Beyond the issue of the certification bar

period, the Board should not attempt to aggrandize its power at
the expense of the legislative branches by either ruling that
union recognition through card check is not a legitimate
organizing tool or by rolling back protections for unions
recognized through card check campaigns.
Congress should reject attempts to amend the NLRA so as to
prohibit card check recognition.

This would limit the original

intent of the NLRA to preserve peaceful industrial relations and
protect an employee’s right to choose whether or not to form a
labor organization.

This would also have a devastating impact

on the labor movement in the United States.

Rather, Congress

should adopt the Employee Free Choice Act to ensure employees
are able to organize when they are able to gain majority
support.

Supporters of the Employee Free Choice Act should
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consider amending the proposed legislation to require a
threshold greater than a simple majority – perhaps 55 percent –
so as to reduce resistance to the legislation and to reduce the
number of challenges to majority status after Congress passes
the legislation.
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